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First,  one  can  reasonably  expect  the total demand  for U.S.  agri-
cultural products  to grow  in real amounts  of 3  percent  or more  per
year during the 1980s.  And,  the volatile export  sector could impose
fluctuations  of  as  much  as  10-15  percent  per  year  on  that  trend.
One  can  probably  expect  the strongest  continuing  export  demand
pressures  to  come for  feed grains and  oilseeds, particularly soybeans.
This  strong  demand can,  in  turn,  be expected  to result,  on  average,
in slightly increasing real prices for farm products.
Second,  the  supply  side  of  agriculture  is  also  subject  to  major
fluctuations  and  the  1981  grain  crop  is  a  good  example.  Recent
projections  set  the  1981  feed  grain  crop  at  19  percent,  the  wheat
crop  at  16  percent  and  the  soybean  crop  11  percent,  respectively
over  1980  levels.  And,  1980  was  a  year  when  existing  production
capacity  was utilized rather fully.
Third,  I  do  not believe  agricultural  structure  impacts  agricultural
production  capacity  significantly  at  least  not  for  the  1980s.  Most
production  entering  commercial  markets  now  comes  from  farm
operating  units  which  are  well mechanized  and use  modem  produc-
tion  practices.  Thus,  near  term  changes  in  structure  will not trans-
late  into  any  major  changes  in  production  capacity  or in the  man-
agement of that capacity.
However,  it is  important for us  to quit using  "Census  of Agricul-
ture" definitions  of farms  when referring to technology use, per unit
production  costs  and  supply  response.  A  much  more relevant  con-
cept  is  that  of  the  "operating  units"  on  which  farm  production
technology  is  actually  applied.  Recent surveys indicate, for example,
that  operating  units  in  the  Cornbelt  now  average  well  over  500
acres and operating units in the Wheatbelt are much larger.
Fourth,  as  the  practitioners  of  U.S.  agricultural  policy  in  the
1950s  and  1960s  became  well  aware,  a  good  deal  of  flexibility
exists  as  to  how  the  agricultural  production  capacity  in  the  U.S.
gets  used.  Thus,  one  cannot  "manage"  a  single  resource  or a single
commodity  without  impacting  on  the  use  of  other  resources  or
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supply  management  programs  proceeded  to  acquire  a  so-called
"cross  compliance"  feature.  But,  even  that  device  was  only  par-
tially  effective  in  curbing  unwanted  shifts  by  farmers  in  resource
use  and  production.  For  simplicity  of  discussion  it  is  necessary  to
minimize  the treatment  of these complex interrelationships  between
resources  and  products  and  within  both  groups.  But,  they  should
not be forgotten!
Fifth,  it  is  realistic  to  assume  that  most  decisions  regarding  the
management  of  agricultural  resources  in  the  1980s  will  be  made
in  a  relatively  free  market  environment.  In  other  words,  manage-
ment  decisions  will  be  made  by investors  and producers  (often, but
not  always,  the  same  persons)  responding  to  price  incentives  and
personal  preferences.  This  is not to suggest that governmental  policy
will not play  a key  role  in the development of these incentives.  But,
that  role  will  most  likely  be  one  of  facilitating,  inducing,  and  en-
couraging rather than one of specifying and regulating.
Finally,  without  elaborating  on the  basis  for this conclusion,  the
comparative  advantage  of  U.S.  agriculture  currently  lies  in  the  ex-
tensive  production  of  energy  products  to substitute  for petroleum-
based  liquid  fuels.  This  situation  isn't likely to change greatly during
the  1980s.  Thus,  I  see  little  merit in targeting large quantities  of our
agricultural resources to the production  of liquid fuels.
This  is  not  to  suggest  that  the  energy  topic  is not an important
one.  Moreover,  I  am  personally  optimistic  that,  in  addition  to  in-
creased  energy  conservation,  we  will  see  some  significant  use  of
agricultural waste  products  for energy  production  such  as the  use of
corncobs  for  drying  grain,  etc.  Also,  some  limited  use of vegetable
oils  as  a  diesel  fuel  substitute  is  probably  a  strong likelihood  as  is
some  modest  use  of  grain  in  the  production  of ethanol.  My  major
point  is,  however,  that  most  agricultural  resources  will  probably
continue to have  a comparative  advantage in the production  of food,
not fuel, and should  be managed  with that objective in mind.
Production Capacity Defined
Production capacity  for purposes  of my discussion  is the capabil-
ity at a given time, to produce agricultural products given  "reasonable
financial  incentives"  to  do  so.  And,  despite  the  pressure  on  prices
from  the  large  1981  crop,  it  looks  as  if  incentives  in  the  form  of
increasing  real  prices  for  grains  and  oilseeds  are  likely  to obtain  in
the  1980s.  The  situation would  be  dramatically different,  however,
if  we  were,  other  things  the same,  considering production  capacity
with  near-term  prices  of $15  for soybeans,  $10 for wheat and $7.50
for  corn.  Such  incentives  would  draw  into  production  resources
which we didn't even  know existed!
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somewhat  less  likely  than for  grains and,  among livestock  products,
only the production  capacity  for poultry  seems likely to  be pressed
by effective  demand  in the  1980s.  Production  of livestock  products
will  continue  to  be  mainly  for domestic  consumption  in the  1980s
and  will  not,  in  general,  be  competitive  with grain  and oilseeds  for
production resources.
Key Components of Production Capacity
Agricultural  productive  capacity  for the  1980s can  be  thought  of
as generated by three components:
(1)  the  stock  of  production  resources  represented  by  land  and
water  resources,  human  capital,  nitrogen  fertilizer  manufacturing
plant  capacity,  other  durable  assets  (e.g.,  irrigation  wells,  combines,
etc.)  Some  are  natural  resources,  but not all are.  Some  can  be  aug-
mented for the  1980s, others cannot.
(2) the  flow  (or set of flows)  of production services which can be
derived  from  available resource stocks within a given time period and
(3)  the  technological  capability  (or  set  of  capabilities)  to  trans-
form production services into agricultural products.
The  rate  at  which  production  services  are  converted  into  prod-
ucts  is,  as  previously  mentioned,  highly  influenced  by (a)  the  finan-
cial  incentives  available  to  entrepreneurs  to make  the conversion(s)
and  (b)  the  constraints  which  prevent  them  from  proceeding  with
these  conversions.  Such  constraints  can  range  all the  way  from legal
regulations  on  pesticide  use,  to internal or external capital rationing,
to lack of information, etc.
Generally  speaking,  we  can  limit major considerations  about pro-
duction  capacity  to  three  categories:  (1)  stocks  of  land  and water
resources;  (2)  expected  new net resources;  and  (3) expected  techno-
logical capabilities  (resource-product  transformation rates).
Production Capacity in the 1980s
Land: In  1949  U.S.  farmers  used  an all-time-high  of 387 million
acres  of  cropland  for  crops  (Table  1).  This included  352  million
acres  of  cropland  harvested,  9  million  acres  of crop  failure  and  26
million  acres  summer  fallow.  In  the  1960s  cropland  used for  crops
dropped  by about  50 million  acres as  farm  program  constraints  and
low  commodity  prices  reduced  harvested  acreage  dramatically.  By
1977,  increased  demand  and  removal  of acreage  constraints pushed
cropland  used  for  crops  back  up to  377  million  acres,  it's  highest
level  in  over  20  years.  In  addition,  there  was  probably  about  20
million acres  of  cropland standing  idle  or in  soil conserving  uses and
16  million  acres  or  so  in  short-term  rotation  pasture.  If one  adds
these  acres  to  those  used  for  crops  one  obtains  a cropland  base  of
about 413 million acres.
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Cropland  Crop  Summer
Harvested  Failure  Fallow  Total
------------------------------------  millions of acres  ---------------  ---------
1949  352  9  26  387
1960s  295  7  35  337
1977  338*  9  30  377
*of which  6  million  acres  was double cropped for an effective  harvested acreage
of  344 million.
In  1981,  farmers  appear  to  have  added  still  another  18  million
acres  or  so of planted  acres  above  1977 levels with about two-thirds
of  this  added  planted  acreage  located  in  the  Wheatbelt.  Thus,  the
additional  cropland  acreage  available  for cultivated crops is probably
now  down  to  20 million  acres or less and much of this acreage needs
to remain in summer fallow and rotation pasture.
In the near-term,  at least, some modest  cutback in planted acreage
in  the  Wheatbelt  appears  both  warranted  and  likely.  Though  an-
other  50  million  acres  or  so  of  land  used  only  for  pasture  is  also
classified  as  potential  cropland,  most  of  this  is  probably  best left
in  permanent pasture.  In  any  event, it represents  only a very modest
addition to the production  capacity for harvested crops.
There  is  some additional  acreage  which  has the  potential of being
converted  to  cropland  as  far as  its  use  capability  is  concerned.  This
acreage  is  variously  estimated at  40 to  70  million acres.  Much  of it
would  require  substantial  investments  for  clearing,  drainage and/or
irrigation.  This  potential  cropland  has remained  unconverted  during
historical  periods  of  high  commodity  prices.  Though  sustained
high  prices  would  undoubtedly  induce  conversion  of  some  of  it
to  cropland  (maybe  10  to  20  million  acres),  much  of this  land  is
probably  controlled  by  entities  which  are  not  very  responsive  to
commodity  price  inducements.  For  other  acres,  the  cost  of  con-
version  is excessively high.
In  sum,  cropland  used  for  crops  in  1981  is  probably  within  5
percent  or  so  of its capacity  for the late  1980s.  The major potential
for increased  production  capacity  in the  1980s  is  not via the use  of
more  cropland  but,  rather,  it is via  the manner in which the existing
cropland  base  is  put  to  use,  i.e.,  the  production  technology  em-
ployed.  Moreover,  there  is  little  likelihood  of any significant conver-
sion  of  new  or  existing  cropland  to  use  for extensive  livestock  pro-
duction.
Water:  The  role  of  water  in  agricultural  production  can  be  visu-
alized  under  the  broader  heading  of  soil  moisture  modification
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Weather  modification  technology  is advancing  some  but will have
essentially  no  application  to  commercial  farming  in  the  1980s.
Recent  technology  in land drainage,  mainly  the installation  of small
diameter  plastic  tubing  using  plows  with  laser  controlled  leveling
devices,  has  resulted  in  labor  efficient,  long lasting and economical
($300  plus per  acre)  drainage  technology.  Wet soils are concentrated
in  the North  Central  Region  of the  U.S. and most will be effectively
drained  with  available  technology  by  the  mid-to-late  1980s.  Even
now,  most  of  the  potential  gain  in  production  capacity  from  land
drainage  has  already  been  realized  and  future installations  will result
mainly  in  improved  timeliness  of  field  operations  and  reduced
production  costs.
Irrigation  is  the  moisture  modification  technology  with  greatest
potential  for increasing  agricultural  production  capacity.  About 60
million  acres  of  cropland  were  irrigated  in  1980.  Of  this,  irrigated
corn  acreage  totalled  about  11.5 million  acres.  And,  sprinkler irriga-
tion of corn using on-farm-pumped-water  was the most rapidly grow-
ing component of irrigated agriculture.
Adoption  of irrigation  technology  for use  in  grain production has
resulted  in  major  increases  in the demand for water, for fossil source
energy  and  for  nitrogen  fertilizer.  In  1975,  77  percent  of the  con-
sumption  of water  withdrawals  in  the U.S.  were  for agriculture,  and
23  percent  was  for all other  purposes.  The latter percentage  was  up
from 10 percent in 1955 and 15 percent in 1965.
Nonagricultural  water  use  is  probably  now  in  the  26-28 percent
of-total-use  range  and  rising.  Both a declining  water  table  in  under-
ground  aquifers  and  increased  competition  from  non-agricultural
water  uses  have  made  competition  for water  supplies  intense  in the
arid  areas  of  the  West  and  Southern  Plains.  In  the  latter  area,  for
example,  nonagricultural  water  use  is  projected  to  increase  by
50  percent  or more  by the year  2000  while agricultural use declines
by 4 percent.
Though  such  projections  are  probably  reasonable  for  arid  and
semi-arid  agriculture,  they  may  underestimate  the  future  of  irriga-
tion  in  more  humid  areas  (east  of  the  Great  Plains)  where  the  re-
charge  capability  of  both  surface  and  subsurface  water  supplies  is
greatest.  Future  energy-crop  price  ratios will  be  an important  deter-
minant  of whether  or not investments  of $500  to $600  or more  in
irrigation  technology  are  made  by  farmers.  It  is  energy  costs  for
pumping and water distribution which constitute the major operating
costs for irrigation.
In  my judgement,  increased irrigation in the Northern Plains, Lake
States,  Corbelt,  and  Southern  Regions  during the 1980s will more
than  off-set  the  decline  in  acreage  in  the  Southern  Plains  due  to
declining water tables.
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likely  increase  aggregate  production  capacity some during the 1980s,
this  increase  will  be  small,  probably  not exceeding  0.5  percent  per
year for the decade as a whole.
Technological Capability: Space  permits  only  a brief discussion  of a
very  complex  topic.  My  objective  is  to  assess  briefly  the  current
situation  for  agricultural  production  technology  and  to  project  it
informally  through  the  1980s.  In  addition  to  assessing  the  more
"established"  technologies  such  as  plant  breeding,  plant nutrition,
pest control,  mechanization,  moisture  modification,  etc.,  it is  useful
also to evaluate  the potential contribution to production capacity of
a  set of emerging  biotechnologies  including genetic  engineering,  cell
tissue  culture,  biological  nitrogen  fixation,  photosynthetic  enhance-
ment and plant growth regulators.
Recently,  a  general  concern  has been  expressed  over the leveling
off  of  agricultural  productivity.  In  our analysis  we  find  evidence  of
(1)  a significant  recent  reduction  in  the annual rate of yield increase
for  corn  associated  with  the  leveling off of nitrogen  inputs,  but (2)
no  significant  narrowing  of  the  differential  between  experimental
yield  levels  and  those  being  realized,  on  average,  by  farmers.  In
addition  to  the  nitrogen  response  phenomenon  for  corn  other
modest  reductions  in  the  rate  of overall  productivity  gain  are  most
likely associated  with:
(1)  the completion  (or near completion)  of the mechanization  of
U.S.  agriculture  and  the  attendant  reduction to a very low level of
labor  inputs  in  farm  production.  Thus,  in  recent  years  there  have
been  only  limited  opportunities  for  productivity  gains  via  annual
reductions in total labor inputs, and
(2)  the shift from  a land  and labor  intensive agricultural  sector to
a  capital  intensive  one.  Additional  capital  infusion  in  the  1940s,
'50s,  and  '60s  clearly  had  dramatic  impacts  to  increase  farm  pro-
ductivity.  But,  the key  purpose  for much  of the new current capital
investment  is  the one of increasing  the output volume (size)  of farm
operating  units  while  "holding  the line"  on labor inputs. As a result,
at  least  some  current  capital  infusions  do  little to increase  the total
output-input (productivity)  ratio in farming.
During  the  1980s  one  can  probably  expect  some  continued
softness  in  rates  of  current  per  acre  yield  gains  due  to established
technologies,  with the  softness  being  most pronounced  where  nitro-
gen fertilizer  applications  are  high  (corn and,  in some  areas, wheat).
Overall,  rates of  gain  will probably  continue  to  be  down  some from
those  of the 1945-70  period.
Most  of the  expected  yield  gains  in  the  1980s  will  be  from  im-
provements  via plant  breeding, soil moisture control, and integrative-
type  managerial  technologies.  The latter include  scouting,  electronic
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systems.  Though  important  to  past productivity  gains,  pest control
and  mechanization  technologies  are  already  servicing  their functions
at  near  maximum  effectiveness.  Thus,  their future  contributions  to
productivity  will be mainly of a maintenance type.
In  the  case  of  emerging  biotechnologies,  the  popular  literature
has  suggested  the  likelihood  of  some  major  near-term  impacts  on
crop  yields from these developments.  The analyses of my colleagues,
Menz  and  Neumeyer,  indicate,  however,  that  these  impacts  will  be
minimal  for  the  decade  of  the  1980s.  Specifically,  the  Menz-Neu-
meyer  survey  of a large number of scientists engaged in agriculturally
related  biotechnology  research  indicates  1990  as  the earliest date  by
which  cell  or  tissue  culture  will  contribute  significantly  to  corn
yields.  It  is  the  mid-1990s  before  the several  other  biotechnologies
are  expected  to make  their initial  significant contributions to yields.
In  sum,  if  the expected  real increases  in demand  of 3  percent  or
more for the 1980s actually materialize and if the preceding appraisal
of likely production capacity gains from more cropland and enhanced
technological  capability  are  correct, demand will  be pressing produc-
tion  capacity  by the  mid-1980s or sooner, and managing production
capacity  will  be a real issue, not a hypothetical  one. One should keep
in  mind,  however,  that  major adjustments  in land  use over the past
several  years  have  pushed  current  (1981)  production  rates to  levels
in excess of utilization.
Significant Environmental Externalities
Several  adverse  outside  influences  have  been  identified  with  the
current  agricultural  production  system.  They  are  complex phenom-
ena  which  are  also  significant  issues  in  the  management  of  our
production  capacity.  With  current  production  technology,  the  fol-
lowing  environmental  problems  have  been  identified  as  existing  in
some degree:
(1)  Excessive  soil  loss  on  some  cropland  due  to water and  wind
erosion.
(2)  A  substantial  mining  of  underground  aquifers  particularly  in
the Southern Plains.
(3)  Some  leaching  of  nitrates  into  drinking  water  supplies parti-
cularly on some coarse, heavily irrigated soils.
(4)  Loss  of wildlife  habitat and/or other nonagricultural amenities
due  to (a)  drainage  and irrigation  developments  and  (b)  cropping of
additional land.
(5)  Excessive  soil salinity  caused by irrigation on some soils.
(6)  Pollution  of  drainage  waters  via  toxic  pollutants  (mainly
pesticides) and nutrients  (mainly nitrogen and phosphorus).
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Lessons  from  the  Past:  In  managing  our  agricultural  production
capacity  two  lessons  from  the  past  seem  paramount.  First,  future
farm  programs  should  avoid  religiously  the  situation  of supporting
prices  above  world  market  levels.  This  was  a problem in the  1950s
and  1960s  but  would  be  a virtual  nightmare in  the  1980s  with  our
heavy  current  reliance  on  export  markets.  Second,  the  inflexible
acreage  allotments  and  related  regulations  of  earlier  periods  of
"production  surpluses"  should  be  carefully  avoided  in  the  future.
Guidelines  for  the  Future:  Policies  with  regard  to  management  of
production  capacity  in  the  1980s  would  do  well  to target on several
key objectives.  These include:
(1)  Inducing the production  system  to perform  at a high  level  of
output  while  maintaining  the  quantity  and  quality  of  the  natural
resource base, particularly  land.
(2)  Addressing the  problems  of instability in  prices for grains and
oilseeds  which  result  mainly  from  the  volatile  export  market  and
from uncontrollable  weather events at home.
(3)  Encouraging  the  development  of  new  improved  technologies
which are  safe  for humans  while cost  effective,  energy  efficient  and
yield increasing,  and
(4)  Maintaining  an  institutional  and  program  support  system
which  permits  individual  farmers to  cope with  problems  of weather
and price risk  and  with  the cash flow problems which they currently
face.
A  single  policy  instrument  may,  of  course,  deal  with  more  than
one of these several objectives.
Inducing  High  Production  Levels:  If,  as  we  suggest,  the  full  ca-
pacity  of  production  is  needed,  on  average,  in  the  1980s,  a set of
effective  price  incentives  should  be  a key instrument of farm policy.
Price  supports - but at levels  below world prices - are an important,
and  probably  necessary,  component.  Target prices  may  or may not
be.  But,  they  can  certainly  play  a key  "incentives"  role  when world
prices are temporarily  soft.
In  any  event,  the  price  incentive  system  should  aim  at accom-
modating  increasing  production  costs  while  avoiding windfall profits
to  landowners  and  the  escalating  land  prices  which  such  profits
generate.  Effective  credit  institutions  and  credit  policies  for "oper-
ting capital"  are  a must  if farmers are to operate at or near capacity.
Equity  capital  and/or  credit  for  restructuring  agriculture  or  for
transferring  ownership  of  assets  may  also  be  justified  but  not  for
reasons of managing production  capacity in the near term.
Aggregate  Price  Instability:  This  instability,  for U.S.  farmers,  can
come  from  the volatility  of either demand  and  supply  or both.  The
88current  decline  in  price  prospects  for  the  1981  crop,  for example,
results  from  both  some  modest  decline  in expected  export volume
and  from  the  prospects  for  bumper  domestic  crops.  But,  if  as  we
suggest,  the  production  system  needs,  on  average,  to operate at or
near capacity  during the 1980s  in order to meet demand needs,  the
key  management  tool available  is that  of intertemporal reallocations
of product supplies, mainly via grain reserve  mechanisms.
Operation  of an  effective farmer held grain reserve program would
appear  to  be  a  desirable  key  component  of  grain  reserve  policies.
Continued  encouragement  of reserve  stockpiling  by  importing coun-
tries  is  another.  And, effective  trade policies,  including  those affec-
ting  exchange  rates,  are of crucial  importance  in reducing instability
in export  markets.  We  also  need to expand our knowledge  about the
"shock absorber"  role which can be played by the domestic livestock
sector during periods of volatile grain prices.
Risk Management at the Farm Level:  Farm program price supports
of  one  kind  or another  are,  of course,  the most effective  policy  for
reducing  farm  level  price  risk.  Their  inclusion  in  the  kit  of  farm
policy  tools  for  the  1980s  is  almost  a  must.  Comprehensive  crop
insurance  is,  aside  from  informal  insurance  schemes  operated  by
producers  themselves,  the  most  effective  protection  from  weather
risk.  But,  most  historical  crop  insurance  programs  have  been  exces-
sively  costly  either  for  the  treasury  or  farmers.  Besides,  they  have
provided ineffective protection.
Most  farmers  will,  for  the  early  1980s  at least, continue  to have
more  weather  risk than product price risk exposure.  Over time, there
may  be  opportunities  to  shore  up the effectiveness  of current  crop
insurance  programs.  But,  weather  risk  exposure  is  not  nearly  as
likely  to  affect  the  effective  use  of  production  capacity  as  is  a
combination  of  internal  and  external  capital rationing generated  by
high  input prices  and the high  cost of capital.  Clearly, the continua-
tion of effective credit institutions  and credit instruments for farmers
is  a  must  as  is  a  continuing  effort  to reduce  inflation  and interest
rates.
Increased  Productivity:  As  indicated  earlier,  we  may  have  about
exploited  the  major  labor  efficiencies  in  commercial  crop  produc-
tion.  With the labor input to produce  100 bushels of corn now down
to  4 hours  or less,  and with similar labor efficiencies  for other crops,
additional  mechanization,  capital  inputs,  or chemical technology for
further labor reduction is probably not top priority.
Rather,  those  technologies  aimed  at  increasing  yields  (plant
breeding,  plant nutrition,  cultural  practices,  etc.)  along  with  those
for reducing  production  variability  (moisture  modification,  develop-
ing  crop  varieties  with  improved  disease  resistance,  etc.)  should
receive  highest  priority.  Already  a  good  deal  of  technology  for
improving  energy  conservation  is  in  the  prototype  or  pilot  stages
89(e.g.,  for  crop  drying  and  irrigation  technologies  particularly)  and
will be available  for commercial  use shortly.
Thus, the 1980s will see some substantial  decreases in the intensity
with  which liquid  energy is used in agricultural production.  Improve-
ments  in  productivity  are  not readily  "managed"  via public  policy.
But,  several  types  of action  do  appear  desirable.  First, strengthened
research  funding coupled  with  some redirection  of research  towards
output  increasing  technology  appears  warranted;  so  does  an  ex-
panded  effort  to  facilitate  the rapid  adoption  of this technology  by
farmers.  Moreover,  improved  information  monitoring  and  manage-
ment  control  systems  can  provide  a  significant  opportunity  to
narrow  the gap  between  experimental  yield  achievements  and those
realized by farmers.
Dealing  with  Undesirable  Outside  Effects:  Our  analysis  of  corn
technology  suggests  that  it  would  be  economically  profitable  for
farmers  to  reduce  or  eliminate  some  current  nitrate  pollution  on
sandy  soils  by  curtailing  wasteful  over-irrigating  and  to reduce  cur-
rent  water  erosion  of  some  Corbelt  soils  by  reduced  tillage.  We
estimate,  for example,  that a continuing loss in corn yield equivalent
of 0.2  bushels  per  acre  per  year  is  being  incurred  on  traditionally
tilled land as compared to land with reduced tillage.
Significant  reductions  in  pollution  of  drainage  water  can  be
achieved  by  better  timing  of  fertilizer  and  pesticide  applications.
Improved  monitoring  of  pest  infestations  to  determine  when  the
presence  of  pest  populations  reaches  threshold  levels  is  one  way  to
improve  the timing and  to reduce  the quantity  of pesticide  applica-
tions.
Not all  adverse  environmental  outside effects will be solved volun-
tarily  by  producers,  however,  and  the  public  policy  dimension  of
dealing  with  these  issues  needs  strengthening.  Though  we  have
imposed  environmental  impact  study  requirements  on  many  other
economic  sectors,  environmental  impact  study  requirements  for
irrigation  developments  on some  very  fragile  soils  are, in most cases,
zero.  And,  we  are  imposing  no economic  penalty  on producers  for
mining  major  underground  aquifers  which  have  very little recharge
capability.  Thus,  until  we  develop  and  adopt effective  policy instru-
ments relative  to environmental  externalities we will continue to run
high  environmental  risks  in  some  areas  of  agricultural  production.
In Conclusion
The  U.S.  agricultural  production  plant  will  be  called  upon  to
increase  its  production  output  substantially  in  the  1980s.  It  can
probably  do  so  without major adverse effects. Further efficiencies in
labor  use  will  be  hard  to  achieve  and  will  have  only  very  limited
value.  Policy  focus  on  the  following  aspects  of  managing  our  pro-
duction capacity should  probably receive  high priority:
90(a)  Effective  price  incentives  to induce  production  of feed  grains
and oilseeds.
(b)  Trade  and  grain  reserve  policies  to  reduce  fluctuations  in
exports and to minimize their impacts  on producers.
(c)  Development  and  adoption  of output increasing  technologies.
(d)  Maintenance  of  effective  credit  instruments  and  institutions
for producers along with reduced  costs of short term credit.
(e)  Incentives  and  regulations  to  reduce  environmental  pollution
and to control the application  of production  technologies  on fragile
soils.
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